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SABBATH OBSERVANCE AND THE WORKPLACE:
RELIGION CLAUSE ANALYSIS AND TITLE VII'S
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION RULE
Donald E. Thornton was employed by a Connecticut retail store
owned by Caldor, Inc. Following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday closing laws, Caldor required Thornton to work one out of
every four Sundays-Thornton's Sabbath. After complying with this
requirement for two years, Thornton informed his superiors that he
would no longer work on Sunday. The company offered him a choice
of transferring to a Massachusetts store that did not require Sunday
work and retaining his supervisory position, or remaining at the Con-
necticut store at a lower salary in a nonsupervisory position which would
not require him to work on Sunday. After rejecting these alternatives,
Thornton was subsequently demoted to a clerical position in the Con-
necticut store. He resigned two days after this demotion.'
Thornton protested Caldor's actions by filing a grievance with the
Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, alleging that the
company had violated a Connecticut state law which provided: "No
person who states that a particular day of week is observed as his
Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An
employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds
for his dismissal." 2 The Board sustained the grievance and ordered the
company to reinstate Thornton. The Connecticut trial court affirmed
this decision, concluding that the statute did not offend the establishment
clause of the first amendment, buth the Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed. Upholding the state supreme court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court held that the statute, by providing Sabbath observers
with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen
Sabbath, violated the establishment clause.'
Prior to Thornton, the Supreme Court created considerable confusion
as to the future of religion clause analysis with its decisions in Marsh
v. Chambers4 and Lynch v. Donnelly.' The Court's desire, in light of
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1. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2914-16 (1985).
2. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985).
3. Thorton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916-18 (1985).
4. 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). Marsh, decided in the 1982-83 term, held
that the Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice did not violate the establishment clause.
In doing so, the Court did not use traditional establishment clause analysis.
5. 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). Lynch, decided in the 1983-84 term, held
that a local government did not violate the establishment clause by owning and displaying
a creche in its annual Christmas display.
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these cases, to clarify its position on religious issues was evident in its
docketing of cases for the 1984-85 term. 6 Thornton was among several
notable first amendment cases decided during this term, and its im-
portance is two-fold. First, it makes clear that, despite the recent tend-
ency of the Court in some cases to de-emphasize traditional establishment
clause analysis, 7 it does not intend to abandon the Lemon test.8 In
addition, Thornton, along with the other religion clause cases decided
in the 1984-85 term, has helped clarify the position taken in Marsh and
Lynch in the development of religion clause analysis. In particular,
Thornton has shed light on the constitutionally permissible scope of
religious accommodations in our society as well as in the workplace.
Secondly, Thornton clarifies lower federal court decisions and gives
guidance to those courts in interpreting the provisions of Title VII which
impose on employers the obligation to make reasonable accommodations
for employees' religious practices. 9 This clarification is especially im-
portant because the Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of
the Title VII religious accommodation provision. In its interpretation of
the Connecticut statute, the Court's discussion of religious accommo-
dation in the workplace is its most substantial commentary on the subject
since its 1977 decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison."0
Religious Accomodations Prior to Thornton
An understanding of the free exercise and establishment clauses"
and the tests that have developed in applying them is essential in un-
derstanding why the Court held the Connecticut Sabbath law unconsti-
tutional. This understanding is also important to comprehend the role
of the religion clauses in defining and limiting the scope of an employer's
Title VII obligation to reasonably accommodate employees' religious
practices. A review of the jurisprudence reveals four kinds of consti-
tutionally acceptable accommodations: (1) exemptions under the free
exercise clause, granted after a balancing of the conflicting interests of
6. Comment, Thornton v. Caldor: Will the Supreme Court Put the Squeeze on
Lemon?, 12 Journal of Leg. 96, 100 (1985).
7. Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Our Christmas Will Be Merry Still, 36 Mercer L. Rev.
409, 420 (1983-84).
8. Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917. "To pass constitutional muster under Lemon a
statute must not only have a secular purpose and not foster excessive entanglement of
government with religion, its primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion."
9. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e(j) (1982).
10. 432 U.S. 63, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
II. U.S. Const. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." (emphasis added).
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the individual and of the government; (2) laws upheld under the estab-
lishment clause because they confer only incidental benefits to religion;
(3) traditional and historical practices with religious elements, which have
been upheld under establishment clause challenges; and (4) statutes,
upheld under the establishment clause test, which were passed as a
response to statutory mandates that unintentionally resulted in an adverse
effect on the free exercise of religion. A close examination of these
categories and the traditional establishment clause criteria will demon-
strate why the statute in Thornton failed to pass constitutional muster.
Balancing Interests: The Free Exercise Cases
The first type of constitutional religious accommodation involves
only the free exercise clause. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 2 the Court
declared that state legislatures, as well as Congress, could not enact
laws which would unreasonably deprive an individual of the fundamental
right of religious liberty guaranteed by the first amendment. 3 When
a fundamental right is at issue, the critical question is what level of
scrutiny the Court will apply. Depending on the facts of the case before
it, the Court has found itself in different positions on the scale of
judicial scrutiny in the area of religious liberty.
In Braunfeld v. Brown, 4 the majority of the Court rejected a free
exercise challenge to Sunday closing laws raised by orthodox Jewish
merchants. The majority made an important distinction between laws
designed to promote the general welfare which directly prohibit a religious
practice, and laws such as the Sunday closing statutes at issue which
made the practice of religion more burdensome and expensive." Chief
Justice Warren's opinion left unclear the test to be applied 6 when
legislation did not directly prohibit a religious practice, but only resulted
in an indirect burden on the exercise of religion. His language, never-
theless, did reveal a reluctance to apply both strict scrutiny and the
most deferential rational basis test.' Yet, just two years later in Sherbert
12. 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940). In Cantwell, the Court held that state laws
prohibiting the free exercise of religion were forbidden by the fourteenth amendment.
13. Id. at 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. at 900, 903 (1940).
14. 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144(1961).
15. Id. at 605, 81 S. Ct. at 1147.
16. Note, General Laws, Neutral Principles and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 Vanderbilt
L. Rev. 149, 155 (1980).
17. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606, 607, 81 S. Ct. at 1147, 1148.
To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes
only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does
not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the
operating latitude of the legislature . . . . Of course to hold unassailable all
legislation regulating conduct which imposes solely an indirect burden on the
observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification.
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v. Verner,"s Justice Brennan, examining a state law which imposed only
an "indirect" burden on religious freedom, applied strict scrutiny to
the legislation, stating that any incidental burden on the free exercise
of appellant's religion could only be justified by a "compelling state
interest."' 9 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,2" the Court retreated from this com-
pelling state interest standard by requiring a "state interest of sufficient
diagnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free
Exercise Clause."12' Legislation adversely affecting free exercise has even
been upheld upon a showing of a rational basis. The Court viewed the
incidental, indirect burden on free exercise so slight as to be almost
nonexistent in Johnson v. Robison."' In that case, the Court used the
rational basis test to hold that a provision of the Veteran's Readjustment
Act of 1966, which denied benefits to conscientious objectors who per-
formed alternative civilian service, did not violate the First Amendment.
The degree of the burden imposed on the fundamental right, whether
direct or indirect, 3 determines which standard the court will use. Along
this spectrum, the most frequently occurring situation with which the
Court has been faced involves state or federal laws, generally applicable
to all citizens or to certain classes of people, which indirectly interfere
with the practice of an individual's religion. Such is the result when
the state's interest in protecting the individual becomes more compre-
hensive and its concerns overlap with religious concerns. The means by
which the state chooses to benefit its citizens may conflict with the
religious practices of the individual.2 4 The Court resolves these conflicts
by balancing the competing interests.25 This balancing approach is best
exemplified by Yoder, where the Court refused to accept the "sweeping
claim" that the state's interest in a system of compulsory education was
so compelling as to prevail over the religious practices of the Amish.
It was the Court's duty to examine the interests of the state and the
possible impediment to those interests if the state granted an exemption
to the Amish. 26 Yoder makes it clear that in balancing the competing
interests, the state must be pursuing a legitimate goal by the least
18. 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790 (1963). Appellant in Sherbert was denied state
unemployment compensation because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day
of her faith. The Court held that the state could not constitutionally apply the unem-
ployment compensation law so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions
respecting her Sabbath.
19. Id. at 403, 83 S. Ct. at 1793.
20. 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
21. Id. at 214, 92 S. Ct. at 1532; see also Note, supra note 16, at 159.
22. 415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160 (1974).
23. Brautfeld, 366 U.S. at 606, 607, 81 S. Ct. at 1147, 1148.
24. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62, 81 S. Ct. ll01, 1154 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. Note, supra note 16, at 170.
26. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 92 S. Ct. at 1536 (1972).
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restrictive means. The state also has the burden of proving that granting
an exception in a particular case would substantially frustrate the achieve-
ment of its goal.
Where the Court grants an exemption, the state may achieve its
constitutional objectives, while the individual is not coerced into violating
his beliefs in order to obtain the benefits and privileges to which he
would be entitled but for those beliefs. The exemption provides in essence
an absolute privilege to the individual and may have the effect of
preferring religiously motivated actions over non-religious ones. Never-
theless, free exercise analysis and values require the exemption in the
face of unintentional, unjustified state-imposed burdens on religious
beliefs and practices." Religious classifications resulting from exemptions
are not only permitted, but at times are even required by the free
exercise clause:28 "In this zone of required accommodation, the theory
is that only an illusory and hostile neutrality would be achieved by
pursuing a religion-blind constitutional idea. ' ' 29 This notion of balancing
the competing interests and the required accommodations, exemplified
by free exercise cases, is important in understanding why the Court
reached its decision in Thornton, even though that decision was con-
sidered under the establishment clause test. In the employment context,
instead of neutral legislation which indirectly burdens religious freedom,
it is the effect of neutral employer work policies that may make it more
difficult or impossible for an employee to practice his religion. Statutes
requiring religious accommodations by employers unless such accomo-
dations would result in undue hardship 0 call for a balancing of all the
interests involved in determining whether an accommodation can be
made. Though employers are under no constitutional duty to protect
religious rights of employees, this process of balancing the interests in
the workplace is analogous to balancing state and individual interests
in free exercise cases to determine whether an accommodation should
be made. It was the absence of balancing that made the Connecticut
statute in Thornton unacceptable to the Court. The law simply gave
the employee a paramount right to his Sabbath day off, without taking
into account the rights of employers and other employees. 3
Incidental Benefits to Religion
The second type of constitutional religious accommodation recog-
nized by the Court involves the separate establishment clause analysis
27. In Sherbert, 374 U.S at 409, 83 S. Ct. at 1797, Justice Brennan asserted that
exemptions granted under free exercise analysis do not violate the establishment clause.
28. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-4 (1978).
29. Id. at 821.
30. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (1982).
31. Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2914, 2916-18.
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developed since Everson v. Board of Education." An understanding of
the development of this test is essential to understanding religious ac-
commodation and the Thornton decision.
The historical background of the first amendment religion clauses
is used as a guide to interpreting them. This is especially true in regard
to the establishment clause. Although there is evidence that at its in-
ception the establishment clause might not have been intended to prohibit
aid to all religions, the accepted view today is that disestablishment
principles prohibit a preference for religion over non-religion." This
conclusion results in a tension between the free exercise and establishment
clauses. If there were not some notion of accommodation of religion
in establishment clause analysis, the Court would be violating free ex-
ercise. Yet, too much accommodation of religious freedom by govern-
ment may violate establishment clause principles. Chief Justice Burger
summarized the Court's precarious position in Walz v. Tax Commission,
when he wrote: "The court has struggled to find a neutral course between
the two religion clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other." 34
Free exercise analysis is triggered by laws which indirectly burden
religious practices. When laws which are passed for the general welfare
indirectly confer benefits on a religious basis, the Court employs estab-
lishment clause analysis. Cases under the establishment clause have gen-
erally arisen in the context of financial assistance and public services
provided to religious schools and institutions. In this context, the Court
will not automatically strike down a law just because the secular effects
that the government seeks to achieve also aid a religious institution. 3
Since the Court has never adopted a theory of strict neutrality, 36 it views
such effects as incidental to the uniform application of laws passed for
the public welfare. 7 These cases help identify the "zone of permissible
accommodation" that the free exercise clause carves out of the estab-
32. 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947). In Everson the Court held that state laws
respecting an establishment of religion were forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the facts of the case, the Court found that transportation reimbursement to parents
of parochial school students as a part of a program to reimburse all parents of school
children was constitutional under the establishment clause.
33. J. Nowak, D. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law, Ch. 19, § 1I (2d. ed. 1983).
34. 397 U.S. 664, 668-69, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (1970).
35. L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 839.
36. Id. at 821. See also Walz, 397 U.S. at 669, 90 S. Ct. at 1412, where Chief
Justice Burger describes the Court's position as one of "benevolent neutrality."
37. Note, Is Title VII's Reasonable Accomodations Requirement A Law Respecting
An Establishment of Religion?, 51 Notre Dame Law. 481, 487 (1976).
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lishment clause.18 These permissible accommodations, unlike required
accommodations, do not result in a preference for religion, but merely
allow religious people and institutions the same treatment and benefits
accorded to others under the law.
The Court has developed a three-part establishment clause test,
referred to as the Lemon test, as it was most clearly defined in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.3 9 Two prongs of the test were cited from Board of Ed-
ucation v. Allen:4 "The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and primary effect of the enactment? ... to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion." 41
Everson and Allen exemplify the kind of accommodation of religion
permissible under the establishment clause. In both cases, the primary
purpose of the laws was secular in that the state was seeking to promote
the educational opportunities of all children. While reimbursement for
bus transportation and the loaning of textbooks obviously released other
funds that could be available for religious purposes, the state legislatures
had set up general programs to help all parents, regardless of their
religion. To exclude parents and children from these programs because
of their religion would not be consistent with the purpose of the first
amendment. 42 Thus, any indirect benefits conferred on a religious basis
or to a religious institution were viewed as incidental. The Court equated
these incidental benefits to the benefits of public police and fire pro-
tection, sewage facilities, streets and sidewalks enjoyed by religious schools,
but which do not rise to the level of support of religious institutions
so as to be a prohibited establishment of religion.4 3
In contrast to these two cases, the Court in Lemon held that salary
supplements to non-public elementary school teachers in the form of
direct payments to church schools and funds for instructional materials
in secular subjects, violated the establishment clause. The programs at
issue had the same secular educational purpose as those in Allen and
Everson; however, the Court determined that the funds for direct salary
supplements and instructional materials had the effect of aiding and
38. L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 823.
39. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
40. 392 U.S. 236, 88 S. Ct. 1923 (1968). In Allen, the Court upheld the inclusion
of religious schools in the New York textbook-loaning program which benefitted elementary
and secondary schools.
41. Id. at 243, 88 S. Ct. at 1926.
42. Id. at 224, 88 S. Ct. at 1926 (1968). In reaching its conclusion in Allen, the
Court asserted that the books and funds did not benefit the parochial schools, but rather
the parents and children.
43. Id. at 224. 88 S. Ct. at 1926.
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promoting religion in a manner that was more than incidental. This
conclusion resulted from the Court's view that in sectarian elementary
and secondary schools, the religious beliefs and practices permeate every
aspect of the institution. Almost any aid to these schools beyond the
types approved in Allen and Everson will result in the use of public
funds to substantially promote religion and religious institutions. The
problem with permeation of religious beliefs in an institution-the dif-
ficulty in severing the secular and sectarian aspects of a religious in-
stitution-gives rise to the third part of the Lemon test: a statute or
government policy must not foster "an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.""4 It could be argued that the aid would not have
the effect of promoting religion as long as the state closely monitored
the program. But, the Court found that the comprehensive, continuing
state surveillance required to ensure religion was not promoted would
result in excessive entanglement between Church and State.45
Traditional and Historical Practices With Religious Elements
The third form of permissible accommodation of religion that has
been recognized by the Court involves certain long-standing, traditional
religious practices carried out by state action, which the Court has held
do not violate the establishment clause. One prominent case referred to
these practices as part of the "fabric of our national life." 46 It is in
this area of permissible, traditional accommodations of religion that the
Court has de-emphasized and even chosen not to apply in one instance,
the three-part Lemon test.
Nebraska's long practice of beginning each legislative session with
a prayer by a state-paid chaplain was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Marsh v. Chambers.' Interpreting the law under the establishment clause,
the Court abandoned the Lemon criteria. Chief Justice Burger
stated that opening sessions of the legislature and other public bodies
with prayer was deeply rooted in the history and tradition of America.
The Court found that Nebraska's practice, which was more than one
44. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1187 (1974).
45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S. Ct. at 2114 (1971). See also Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 91 S. Ct. 2091 (1971), where the absence of religious permeation and
problems of severability led the Court to uphold various forms of substantial financial
aid to church-related institutions of higher learning. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Tilton expressed the view espoused in subsequent cases, that such institutions are char-
acterized by a high degree of academic freedom and their predominant mission is to
provide students with a secular education. Any benefits in this context are also viewed
as incidental.
46. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676-77, 90 S. Ct. at 1415.
47. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330.
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hundred years old and consistent with almost two centuries of national
practice, was a permissible accommodation. It posed no more of a threat
to the establishment clause than the provision for transportation reim-
bursement in Everson.48
Though in Lynch v. Donnelly"9 the Court applied the Lemon test,
it de-emphasized the importance of the criteria and focused instead on
the goal of accommodation.50 The Court found that a local government
did not violate the establishment clause by owning and displaying a
creche in its annual Christmas display. The effects of the Nativity display
were equated to those incidental effects found in permissible accom-
modations previously upheld under the Tax-Clause tax exemptions for
church property, funds for textbooks, transportation for students and
building funds for sectarian universities.' In her concurring opinion in
Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor cited an observation made by
Justice Holmes in Jackson v. Rosenbaum Co. which, though made in
another context, adequately summarizes the reason for the Court's per-
mitting government accommodations of religion based on the place of
traditional activities in our society: "If a thing has been practiced for
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for
the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."" 2
The Court's use of the Lemon test in Thornton and other religion
clause cases in the 1984-85 term makes it clear that Marsh and Lynch
did not signal the demise of traditional establishment clause analysis.
These two cases more clearly defined another category of permissible
accommodations that the free exercise clause carves out of the estab-
lishment clause." The results in Marsh and Lynch indicate that similar
long-standing, traditional religious practices sanctioned or carried out
by the government will likely be upheld against an establishment clause
challenge. Subsequent cases involving religious issues, including Thorn-
ton, have helped to clarify the proper place and role of Marsh and
Lynch in the development of religion clause analysis.
Statutorily Mandated Accomodation
The fourth area where the Court has determined that the free exercise
clause permits an accommodation of religion, involves statutes whose
48. Id. at 786, 791, 103 S. Ct. at 1363.
49. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355.
50. Note, supra note 7.
51. 465 U.S. 668, 681-82, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 (1984).
52. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2503 (1985), Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion citing an observation made by Justice Holmes in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,
260 U.S. 22, 31, 43 S.Ct. 9, 9-10 (1922).
53. L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 823. See Watz, 397 U.S. 676-78, 90 S. Ct. at 1415-16.
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specific purpose is to grant an exemption or accommodation on a
religious basis. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree
suggested that the challenge posed by cases involving these statutes was
to define the proper establishment clause limits on voluntary efforts to
facilitate the free exercise of religion.14 The only laws promoting free
exercise that could be upheld under this analysis would be those that
lift a direct or indirect burden on the free exercise of religion that has
been imposed by the government." In essence, the statute would be
valid only if the government were acting to alleviate some burden on
religious freedom that resulted from prior state action. A review of the
jurisprudence reveals the validity of O'Connor's conclusions. Two leading
Supreme Court cases, Zorach v. Clausen 16 and Gillette v. United States,57
involved statutes promoting free exercise of religion that were passed
in response to state and federal actions which made the individual
practice of religion more arduous. The remaining cases involving leg-
islative efforts to promote free exercise of religion held the statutes
invalid under the Lemon analysis, for lack of a secular purpose and
for having the impermissible effect of giving state endorsement to religion
and religious practices." None of these statutes sought to lift burdens
on religious practice imposed by prior state action. Instead, the laws
54. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2504-05.
55. Id.
56. 343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952). In Zorach, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a New York City release time program, which permitted its public schools
to release students during the school day for religious instruction or devotion, as a
permissible accommodation of state compulsory education laws. The city realized that the
failure to provide excused absences for religious purposes would likely make it more
difficult for students to receive religious instruction or to fulfill religious duties to attend
services. The law merely placed absences for illness and family emergencies, therefore, a
student was not penalized for such absences and was not forced to choose between school
and religious obligations.
57. 401 U.S. 437, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971). In Gillette, the Court upheld against an
establishment clause challenge, the constitutionality of a provision of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967 which exempted any person from the draft who was conscientiously
opposed to war by reason of religious training and belief. In addition to the national
defense concerns, the deferral statute granting the exemption was a reaction to the
oppressive effects on a person's beliefs as a result of mandatory military service.
58. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261 (1962) (holding the requirement
by the New York Board of Regents that a nondenominational prayer be recited in all
public schools at the beginning of the school day to be unconstitutional under the
establishment clause); Abington School District v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560
(1963) (holding a requirement that schools begin each day with Bible readings to be
unconstitutional under the establishment clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89
S. Ct. 266 (1968) (holding the Arkansas anti-evolution statute of 1928 to be unconstitutional
under the establishment clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional under the establishment clause the Alabama statute authorizing a daily
period of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer).
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reflected a legislative policy to promote the welfare of the community
by promoting religious values. But what has been illustrated by free
exercise exemption cases also holds true for statutes challenged under
the establishment clause. The exemptions and statutes are characterized
as required and permissible accommodations only because they are a
reaction to previously imposed government burdens on the free exercise
of religion. Thus, in the absence of any state-imposed burdens on
religious activities, the statutes cannot be upheld as constitutional ac-
commodations of religion. 9
Religious Accomodations and Thornton
In its free exercise and establishment clause decisions, the Court has
upheld different forms of religious accomodation in limited circumstan-
ces. This limited application grew out of the tension between the two
religion clauses. 60 The Court's task has been a delicate one. In its analysis
the Court has attempted to reach results that did not unreasonably force
a person to choose between his religious and state obligations, that did
not deny benefits to anyone because of their religion, and that did not
deny the traditional role of religion in our society. The Court was at
all times restrained by establishment clause principles and its previous
decision that the religion clauses protect religion as well as non-religion.
In view of the Court's assertions that it will not be bound to one
test in establishment clause cases and of its recent accommodation of
historical or traditional activities,6' this comment will examine the Con-
necticut statute involved in Thornton, with respect to the four types of
religious accommodation accepted by the Court, and the three-part Lemon
test.
The statute, which stated that no person who asserted that a day
of the week was his Sabbath could be required by his employer to work
on that day, must be classified in the fourth category of religious
accommodation. This is the category of cases arising under the estab-
lishment clause, in which the government attempts to promote free
exercise of religion by statute. As a statute promoting free exercise, it
can be upheld only if it was enacted in response to some previous action
by the Connecticut legislature that burdened the religious freedom of
individuals. The statute in Thornton did not represent such a response.
The legislature had not previously passed any law that operated to restrict
59. Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2505.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34.
61. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362-64 where the Court restated that it will not be
bound to one test and also emphasized the country's long history of "accommodation"
of religion and even cited Zorach for the proposition that the constitution affirmatively
mandates accommodation.
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a person's right to observe his Sabbath. Rather than a reaction to any
state-imposed burden on free exercise, granting a Sabbath observer this
absolute privilege was an attempt to negate the effects of neutral work
schedules and policies of private employers. Therefore, the law conferring
such a privilege on Sabbath observers could not be upheld as a con-
stitutionally permissible accommodation of religion.
The Court's analysis of the Connecticut law relied solely on the
Lemon test.62 The Court found that the statute went beyond any in-
cidental or remote effect of advancing religion and had the impermissible
effect of advancing a particular religious practice-Sabbath observance. 63
Because a law must pass all parts, of the test to be constitutionally valid,
failure to meet the effect prong was sufficient to invalidate the statute.
Most of the brief opinion focused on the problems that would result
from granting employees an absolute right to refuse to work on their
Sabbath. The Court's concern about the results in the workplace of
giving Sabbath observers and religious rights priority over all other
individual rights and interests led to the invalidation of the statute by
a vote of 8-1. 64 The majority expressed the view that the Connecticut
law would impose an absolute duty on employees and employers to
conform their business practices to the particular religious practice of
Sabbath observance. 6 The Chief Justice, writing for the majority, il-
lustrated the disruptive effect that granting such an unqualified right
would have in the workplace. He focused on the absence of exceptions
in the law for special circumstances, such as those involving school
teachers, as well as of provisions allowing for consideration of the interest
of other employees. Additionally, the statute at issue provided no relief
for an employer if a high number of his employees requested the same
Sabbath, or if giving an employee his Sabbath day off resulted in a
substantial economic burden for the employer.66 It is evident that the
Court's chief concern was not over Connecticut's promotion of the
practice of Sabbath observance, but over the disruptive effect this law
would have had in industry and commerce, and the law's mandating
that decisions concerning work schedules and policies be controlled by
the religious needs of employees. These far reaching effects negated any
asserted secular purpose for the Connecticut statute.
It is notable, however, that the Court did little to advance the
understanding of establishment clause principles and traditional analysis.
The Court merely stated the appropriate test and only nominally applied
62. Thorton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917.
63. Id.
64. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented, but he did not write a dissenting opinion.




one of the criteria. The most enlightening aspect of Thornton in terms
of religion clause analysis was the majority's use of Judge Learned
Hand's statement of the fundamental principle of the religion clauses:
"[T]he First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his
own religious necessities.' '67
The decision in Thornton is enlightening as to the constitutionally
permissible scope of religious accommodations in our society. The de-
cision also reaffirmed the Court's continued use of the traditional es-
tablishment clause test. Nevertheless, the Court should have discussed
all of the aspects of the test and applied the relevant facts of the case
to each of the criteria. This application, along with a more thorough
discussion of prior establishment clause cases would have furthered the
understanding of the modern Court's interpretation of religious issues
at a time when there is some uncertainty about the nature and continued
use of traditional tests.
6
1
Thornton's Effect on Title VII's Reasonable
Accommodation Provision
The situation which most frequently occurs under the Title VII
provision of reasonable accommodation of employees' religious practices
involves Sabbath observance. The problem arises when facially-neutral
job requirements, schedules and policies have the effect of making it
impossible for an employee to observe his Sabbath. In Thornton, the
Connecticut statute provided that no employer could require an employee
to work on a day of the week observed as his Sabbath, and no employer
could dismiss an employee for refusing to work on his Sabbath. There-
fore, the Court's reasoning in Thornton sheds light on the constitu-
tionality of the Title VII reasonable accommodation provision and the
extent of the employer's duty of accommodation in the vast majority
of the cases that arise in the lower federal courts.
Legislative History of Title VII Religious
Accommodation Provisions
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which
prohibited discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Though Title VII originally prohibited discrim-
ination based on religion, Congress did not define the term "religion. "69
Guidelines issued in 1966 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
67. Id. (citing Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
68. See text accompanying supra note 61 and supra notes 4, 54.
69. B.Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 206 (2d. ed. 1982).
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mission (EEOC) provided that the employer had an obligation under
the statute to accommodate religious needs "where such accommodations
can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of business." 70
Accommodation was needed to mitigate the effect of neutral employer
policies upon employees with sincere religious beliefs about Sabbath
work and observance. This idea was consistent with the EEOC's general
rule that neutral policies violated Title VII if they adversely affected
protected groups." In 1967, the EEOC issued new guidelines which
defined the employer's duty: "to make reasonable accommodations to
the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such
accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business." 72 The new guidelines also placed the burden
on the employer to prove that a particular accommodation would produce
an undue hardship. 73
The 1967 guidelines were tested in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,'7
where the plaintiff refused to work on Sunday or to seek a replacement
to cover his absence. The sixth circuit held that it was unreasonable to
consider as discriminatory the refusal of employers, whose policies ap-
plied uniformly to all employees, to make accommodations for the small
number affected by their policies. 7 The court required the plaintiff to
show a conscious intent on the part of the employer to discriminate
against him. Because most acts of discrimination do not occur as a
result of intentional conduct on the part of the employer, but result
from an unwillingness of the employer to adjust his policies when he
could do so without undue hardship, this burden was a difficult one.
6
In 1972, Congress responded to Dewey by enacting 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j),
which imposed the affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation now
found in Title VII."1 Failure to accommodate an employee's religious
beliefs, absent proof 1of undue hardship, was made an unlawful em-
70. 29 C.F.R. 1605.1(a)(2) (1966).
71. B. Schlei and P. Grossman, supra note 69, at 210.
72. 29 C.F.R. 1605.1(b) (1980).
73. B. Schlei and P. Grossman, supra note 69, at 210.
74. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689, 91 S. Ct. 2186 (1971).
75. Comment, Religious Observance and Discrimination in Employment, 22 Syracuse
L. Rev. 1019, 1206 (1971)i
76. Id. at 1030.
77. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (1982) states: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." (2000e(j) was also prompted by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91
S. Ct. 849 (1971), which held that benign employment policies can violate Title VII if
they are discriminatory in effect.)
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ployment practice. Once an employee made out a prima facie case, the
burden was on the employer to prove an accommodation would cause
undue hardship, Congress's action in 1972 strengthened Title VII's pro-
hibition against disparate treatment on the basis of religion. The addition
of this affirmative duty was logical in light of the fact that, without
such a duty, an employee fired because his religious practices did not
coincide with the employer's uniform work rules would have the heavy
burden of proving the intent of the employer to discriminate. The
difficulty of proof and the lack of an affirmative duty in the statute
gave employers little incentive to make accommodations. In view of the
1972 amendment, employers must examine whether their policies and
practices produce discriminatory effects and whether their legitimate
business interests may be accomplished by a policy with a less adverse
impact on a protected class. Specifically, in the case of adverse effects
of work policies on Sabbath observers, the employers must search in
good faith for alternative ways to attain their business goals, which
allow the employee to fulfill his religious obligations.78 The legislative
history of Title VII's reasonable accommodation provision makes it clear
that Congress wanted to proscribe not only intentional discrimination,
but also employer practices which lack a business justification and which
have the effect of discriminating on a religious basis. 79
Constitutionality of Title VI's Reasonable
Accommodation Provision
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the consti-
tutionality of the Title VII reasonable accommodation provision either
on its face or as applied. Arguably, the provision and the guidelines,
by requiring a private employer to accommodate employee religious
practices, are laws respecting an establishment of religion and therefore
violate the first amendment.se
In Dewey, the sixth circuit stated that the duty to accommodate
employee religious practices unless undue hardship can be shown, even
with a statutory basis, "would raise grave constitutional questions of
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."'"
Lower federal courts have discussed the constitutionality of the
reasonable accommodation provision. One of the most thorough dis-
78. Boothby and Nixon, Religious Accommodation: An Often Delicate Task, 57 Notre
Dame Law. 797, 803 (1982).
79. Note, Civil Rights-Religious Discrimination in Employment-Title VII Standards
of "Reasonable Accommodation" and "Undue Hardship" Are Constitutional, But Recent
Cases Illustrate Judicial Overzealousness in Enforcement, 54 Texas L. Rev. 616, 627
(1976).
80. B. Schlei and P. Grossman, supra note 69, at 212.
81. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 334.
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cussions of this issue is found in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,2 This
case involved a plant shift supervisor, Cummins, who was obligated to
work Saturdays. When Cummins joined the World Wide Church of
God, which forbids work on the Sabbath from Friday sundown, he
refused to work on Saturdays. He was fired because of complaints from
other supervisors who were forced to work for him. The sixth circuit
reversed the district court and found that Cummins was the victim of
religious discrimination.
The court held that the reasonable accommodation rule did not
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment, and, in so
holding, analyzed the provision in terms of the Lemon purpose, effect
and entanglement test." In the court's view, 2000e(j) had an adequate
secular purpose of preventing discrimination in employment by strength-
ening the prohibition against religious discrimination originally included
in Title VII.84 Secondly, the primary effect of the reasonable accom-
modation rule was neither to advance nor inhibit religion. Conceding
that some religious institutions might derive incidental benefits from the
law, the court found such benefits permissible in light of the Supreme
Court's mandate that a law was not necessarily unconstitutional just
because it conferred incidental or indirect benefits upon religious insti-
tutions.8 ' The majority viewed the primary effect as one inhibiting dis-
crimination and not one advancing religion.8 6 Finally, the court found
that 2000e(j) would not cause excessive entanglement of government with
religion. The employer contended that in determining whether a rea-
sonable accommodation could be made, EEOC investigators would be
forced to evaluate the beliefs of religious sects in order to determine
when an employee's practices were truly religious and therefore protected
under Title VII. The court reasoned that, if the issue arose, it would
involve no more entanglement than occurs in deciding whether a church
qualifies for a property tax exemption.8 7 In the court's opinion, its
position was supported by Supreme Court cases upholding Sunday closing
laws."8
82. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65,
97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), vacated and remanded 433 U.S. 903, 97 S. Ct. 2965 (1977).
83. 516 F.2d at 551-52, citing Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973).
84. 516 F.2d at 552.
85. Id. at 553, citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771-72, 93 S. Ct. at 2955.
86. 516 F.2d at 553.
87. Id. at 554. See Walz, 397 U.S. 664, 674-76, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (1970).
88. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144 (1961) and McGowan, 366 U.S.
420, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961). In these cases the United States Supreme Court asserted that
the laws in question had evolved from their religious origin and developed a secular
character, so that the present purpose and effect of Sunday closing laws was not to aid
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Circuit Judge Celebrezze dissented in Cummins, stating that by
granting preferences to employees on the basis of religion, the federal
government had breached the wall between church and state. Under the
provision, an employee could be exempted from Saturday work for
religious reasons, but other employees were not given the same treatment
if they did not choose to work on Saturdays for valid secular reasons.
Accordingly, in his opinion, the reasonable accommodation rule did not
pass the purpose and effect test of establishment clause analysis. Even
though Congress had acted with the valid secular purpose of preventing
discrimination in employment, the impact of the rule negated this secular
purpose. Rather than sustaining the existing prohibition against religious
discrimination, the reasonable accommodation rule mandated religious
discrimination, which was inconsistent with the basic purpose of Title
VII. s9 According to Judge Celebrezze, the employer, in his discretion,
could decide to accommodate his employees' religious practice, but when
the federal government required such accommodation, it breached the
neutrality principle at the heart of the first amendment. 90 When Congress
mandated unequal treatment on a religious basis, it blurred the separation
of church and state and undermined the first amendment principles of
voluntarism and separatism. 9
As noted, the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the
question of the constitutionality of 2000e(j). Nevertheless, Thornton
offers guidance in ascertaining how the Supreme Court might decide
the issue. The eight Justices who joined in the majority opinion in
Thornton found the Connecticut statute granting Sabbath observers an
absolute right not to work on their Sabbath to be unreasonable, because
it did not allow for consideration of any reasonable accommodation
proposals made by the employer. 92 The law also required that respect
of Sabbath observance automatically prevail over all secular interests in
the workplace. 93 With this reasoning, the majority alluded to the Title
VII provision, which only requires reasonable accommodation. Title VII
does not require that Sabbath observers automatically be given the day
off. Unlike the Connecticut statute, 2000e(j) calls for a balancing process
religion but to set aside a uniform day of rest for the public welfare. In the view of the
majority of the Sixth Circuit in Cummins, Sunday closing laws forced businesses to shut
down on Sundays, thus accommodating the religious needs of the majority Christian
population. Since 2000e(j) mandates only reasonable accommodation without undue hard-
ship, it constitutes much less interference with the employer's rights than does a law
requiring an employer to close his business.
89. Cummins, 516 F.2d 544, 556 (Celebreeze, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 558-59.
91. Note, The Constitutionality of An Employer's Duty to Accommodate Religious
Beliefs and Practices, 56 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 635, 668-69 (1980).
92. Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
93. Id.
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which takes into account all of the factors found missing in Thornton 4
which involve consideration of the rights and interests of employers and
other employees. The Court determined that the Connecticut law violated
fundamental principles of the religion clauses by granting unyielding
weight in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests. 95 It follows
that the reasonable accommodation rule, by weighing the interests of
Sabbath observer, employer, and other employees, would be more in
line with first amendment principles developed under establishment clause
analysis.
Justice O'Connor and Justice Marshall joined in a concurring opinion
in Thornton in which they specifically mentioned the religious accom-
modation provision of Title VII. The justices did not read the majority
opinion to suggest that 2000e(j) was invalid. 96 The concurrence did not
discuss the effect or entanglement issues, but briefly considered the
requirement of a valid , secular purpose. Justice O'Connor concluded
that the provision, as part of Title VII, attempted to lift a burden on
religious practice imposed by private employers and manifested the sec-
ular purpose of guaranteeing employment opportunity to all in a plur-
alistic society. 97 In her opinion, the law was an anti-discrimination law
and not an endorsement of religion or religious practices. Justices O'Con-
nor and Marshall asserted that by calling for reasonable rather than
absolute accommodation, Title VII's requirement would be valid under
the establishment clause. 98
In addition to the arguments set forth by the majority in Cummins
and the concurrence in Thornton, other factors lead to the conclusion
that 2000e(j) would survive an establishment clause test. The general
anti-discriminatory purpose of the law has already been noted and prior
jurisprudence has shown that the Court finds a valid, secular purpose
in almost all cases." In terms of primary effect, the focus of the provision
is accommodation. Accommodation is viewed as a neutral principle, 8'°
and, as such, consistent with the Court's efforts to maintain a position
of neutrality in view of the tension between the two religion clauses.
The statute calls for a balancing process, with the ultimate decision
reached according to the facts of each case. Therefore, once it is de-
termined that the employer can make an accommodation without undue
hardship, any benefits to religion are incidental, just as other consti-
94. See supra test accompanying notes 64-66, and Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
95. Thorton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
96. Id. at 2919 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For cases where a secular purpose has not been found, see supra note 58.




tutionally required and permissible accommodations.' 0' Since decisions
must be made on the facts of each situation with a balancing of the
various interests, 2000e(j), on its face and as applied, does not promote
religion over non-religion. If the Court determines that an accommo-
dation is required, it is implicit in this factual determination that the
accommodation is a reasonable burden on the employer and other em-
ployees, and that the accommodation ordered for the Sabbath observer
will not be at the expense of other valid secular concerns.
The Constitutionally Permissible Scope of an Employer's Duty of
Reasonable Accommodation
Determining whether a reasonable accommodation without undue
hardship is possible in a particular case involves a balancing test similar
to the one used in free exercise exemption cases. Statutes and uniform
work rules can unintentionally make the practice of one's religion more
difficult. It is possible that a person may be forced to choose between
his job and his religious convictions. In the process of balancing the
competing interests and policies, the courts seek an accommodation that
will substantially satisfy all parties and prevent the individual from having
to make such a choice.
In Title VII cases, it is the effect of neutral employment policies
and the needs and rights of employers and employees, rather than
legitimate state goals manifested in laws for the general welfare, that
creates problems for the Sabbath observer. Unlike exemption cases, the
balancing of interests and granting of accommodations in the employ-
ment context is more difficult than granting an exemption from legis-
lation. A private employer is under no constitutional duty to protect
first amendment rights. In the workplace, a broad accommodation could
directly affect many people and be potentially disruptive of business
and other employee's rights. Business needs, like state goals, can be
compelling; yet, if an alternative exists, which would allow an employer
and other employees to achieve their interests without impairing the
rights of the Sabbath observer, and that alternative is not pursued, Title
VII's prohibition against religious discrimination has been violated. 02
In order to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination,
a plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) he has a bona fide belief that
compliance with an employment requirement is contrary to his religious
faith; (2) he informed his employer about the conflict; and (3) he was
discharged because of his refusal to comply with the employment re-
101. Note, supra note 79, at 629.
102. Note, supra note 16, at 160.
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quirement.10 3 Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that available accommodations
will cause undue hardship. If the court finds that the employer has
proved undue hardship, the employer does not have to allow any ad-
justments of work policies.
To define and apply the reasonable accommodation rule, a definition
of undue hardship was necessary. The Supreme Court gave its first
pronouncement on the extent of reasonable accommodation and the
definition of undue hardship in Hardison.'°4 Hardison worked in a
department of TWA which operated 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
He was subject to a seniority system contained in a collective bargaining
agreement under which the most senior employees had first choice for
job and shift assignments. Hardison joined the World Wide Church of
God and informed his manager that he could no longer work from
sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday in observance of his Sabbath.
The manager agreed that the union steward should try to seek a job
swap or change of days off for Hardison. The problem was temporarily
solved when he transferred to the night shift, but reappeared when
Hardison transferred to another building where he did not have enough
seniority to bid for shifts that would allow him to have his Sabbath
off.105 In rejecting the available alternative as reasonable, the Court
concluded that the extent of an employer's duty of reasonable accom-
modation required the employer to incur no more than "de minimis"
cost.' °6 The Court viewed the following suggested accommodations as
constituting more than a de minimis cost: leaving the position vacant
when it was critical to airline operations; filling in with another employee
when it would leave another important operation understaffed; paying
premium overtime wages or requiring violation of the seniority provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement.107
Violating the seniority system to relieve Hardison of Saturday work
and forcing a more senior employee to replace him would have deprived
the more senior employee of his contractual rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. 0 8 The Court explained:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accom-
modation" Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift
and job preference of some employees, as well as deprive them
103. See Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601
F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979).
104. 432 U.S. 63, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
105. Id. at 68, 97 S. Ct. at 2269.
106. Id. at 84, 97 S. Ct. at 2277.
107. Id. at 76-77, 97 S. Ct. at 2273.
108. Id. at 80, 97 S. Ct. at 2275.
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of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer
the religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII
does not require an employer to go that far.' °9
The majority made it clear that there would be no broad interpretation
of the employer's duty by stating: "[W]e will not readily construe the
statute to require an employer to discriminate against some employees
in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath."" 0 Hardison dictates
that establishment clause concerns, the needs of business to establish uni-
form work rules, the rights of other employees and the importance
of collective bargaining for industrial and economic stability, outweigh
free exercise rights in cases involving collective bargaining agreements."'
The Court viewed seniority systems and other neutral employment pol-
icies as the most equitable way to allocate privileges and duties among
employees." 2 If such systems are set up on an impartial basis, any
accommodation of an employee's religious practices must be made within
the existing system.
The outcome in Hardison severely limited the extent of the accom-
modation required under 2000e(j). The Court was in the uncomfortable
position of having to choose between narrowly construing the rule and
mandating religious preference. The majority chose narrow construction
since requiring religious preferences would have raised serious consti-
tutional questions."' The decision, therefore, was required by the es-
tablishment clause in addition to the paramount policy of achieving
industrial stability through collective bargaining.
Lower federal courts have continued to follow Hardison and do not
interpret the reasonable accommodation provision to require an employer
to violate the contractual rights of other employees under a valid col-
lective bargaining agreement." 4 The existence of such an agreement does
not mean that an accommodation is automatically denied; there may
be other alternatives the employer could pursue which would not require
violation of the union contract and would require only de minimis cost.",
109. Id. at 81, 97 S. Ct. at 2275.
110. Id. at 85, 97 S. Ct. at 2277.
Ill. Id. at 84-85, 97 S. Ct. at 2277. See also Comment, Transworld Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison: A Limitation on the Employer's Duty to Accomodate the Religious Practices
of His Employees, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 835, 844-45.
112. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 80-81, 97 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
113. Note, supra note 91, at 647.
114. See Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977); Cross v. Bailar, 477
F. Supp. 748 (D. Ore. 1979); Turpen v. Missouri-Texas-Kansas R. R., 736 F.2d 1022
(5th Cir. 1984); Huston v. Local No. 93 UAW, 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977); Rohr v.
Western Electric Co., 567 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1977); Wren v. T.I.M.E., 59 F.2d 441 (8th
Cir. 1979); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Kendall v.
United Airlines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1380 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
115. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 80, 97 S. Ct. at 2275.
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Nevertheless, the Sabbath observer who requests an accommodation
should be aware that if the only available alternative requires violating
the collective bargaining agreement, his request will be denied and any
suit filed challenging the decision will be futile.
Even absent a collective bargaining agreement, courts do not require
employers to grant significant "privileges" in the name of accommo-
dating the religious needs of employees. The Supreme Court's ruling
that employers are not required to incur any more than de minimis
costs means that an accommodation will be made within the existing
system rather than in derogation of it. Moreover, the courts will not
impose duties on an employer which either require more than de minimis
costs in wages and efficiency or coerce other employees in a manner
tantamount to reverse discrimination." 6
In Murphy v. Edge Memorial Hospital,"7 a licensed practical nurse
(LPN) who belonged to the World Wide Church of God interviewed
for a position, during which she explained her religious views to the
supervisors. The employer stated that the hospital would attempt to
accommodate her religious beliefs, which it was able to do for about
five months. In response to a great number of complaints from other
employees, Murphy was scheduled to work on some Fridays, but some
consideration was still given to her Sabbath. After the supervisor in-
formed her that she would continue to be scheduled for Friday work,
plaintiff began calling in sick or refusing the shift. When it became
clear after several meetings that Murphy would not work on Fridays,
the hospital fired her."8 The issue presented to the court was whether
the hospital could have reasonably accommodated Murphy's religious
practice without incurring undue hardship." 9 The district court, following
Hardison, found that the hospital relied on a neutral scheduling system,
under which each staff person was required to work an average of three
weekends out of four, and that there was a shortage of dependable,
part-time LPN's. By allowing Murphy to have every Friday off, the
hospital could not meet its average staffing needs on the weekends.
Scheduling Murphy to work on Saturday forced other LPN's to split
their free weekends and required the hiring of another full-time LPN.
The costs of such accommodations were clearly more than de minimis.
The court also concluded that the plaintiff could not be accommodated
within the existing framework, because such an accommodation would
deprive other employees of the benefits of the neutral scheduling sys-
tem. 120
116. Id; see also B. Schlei and P. Grossman, supra note 69, at 236.
117. 550 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
118. Id. at 1187.
119. Id. at 1188.
120. Id. at 1192.
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Another recent case that illustrates the lower federal courts' appli-
cation of Hardison in situations not involving a collective bargaining
agreement is Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital.12 Brener, a hospital
staff pharmacist, informed the director shortly after beginning work that
his faith prohibited his working on his Sabbath-sunset Friday to sunset
Saturday. The director ordered schedule changes to accommodate the
plaintiff. After reviewing employee complaints, the supervisor told Brener
that he would have to arrange his own exchanges. Brener did not attempt
to work within the flexible scheduling system to arrange an exchange.
According to the court, his suggested alternatives of hiring a substitute,
using the supervisor in his place, or leaving the spot open, all resulted
in more than a de minimis cost to the hospital. 22 In addition, the court
refused to require deprivation of other employees' shift preferences to
accommodate his Sabbath observance.123
As illustrated by Murphy and Brener, the principles of Hardison
have been extended by lower federal courts to situations that do not
involve collective bargaining agreements. When a neutral scheduling
system comparable to seniority systems in labor-union contracts is em-
ployed, the religious observer must be accommodated within that system,
thus avoiding the deprivation of other employees' rights and benefits.
Monetary and efficiency costs which are greater than de minimis will
not be imposed on the employer and other employees.
Conclusion
In view of the Supreme Court's establishment and free exercise
clause decisions, the Hardison decision and subsequent federal court
reasonable accommodation cases, the outcome in Thornton was pre-
dictable. By its decision in Thornton the court made it clear that it
would not extend the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate
beyond a de minimis level, 2 4 or read 2000e(j) to require reverse dis-
crimination in order to accommodate an employee's religious practices.
Any attempt to expand the extent of an employer's duty to accommodate
an employee's religious beliefs beyond the limits of the decided cases
would come close to an absolute guarantee' 2' that an employee's religious
rights would have priority over all other rights in the workplace. Such
a result was attempted by the Connecticut statute in Thornton. The
121. 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982).
122. Id. at 146.
123. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 76-77, 97 S. Ct. at 2273.
124. Id. at 81, 85, 97 S. Ct. at 2275, 2277.
125. Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977) (employee's
demand for absolute guarantee that she would not have to work on Saturday found to
be unreasonable, and an accommodation the employer was not required to make).
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Supreme Court invalidated that statute, just as it has refused to broadly
construe the reasonable accommodation rule.
The weight of establishment clause concerns, business needs, rights
of employees and the integrity of collective bargaining agreements have
resulted in very limited accommodations of employee religious practices.
Any accommodation must be accomplished without the denial of em-
ployer's and other employees' rights and within the neutral system set
up to allocate employee hours, duties and privileges.
In a dissent in Hardison, Justice Marshall explained why he did not
view a breach of a collective bargaining agreement to accommodate the
religious needs of the employee or to give religion priority in the work-
place, to be a violation of the establishment clause:
If the State does not establish religion over nonreligion by
excusing religious practitioners from obligations owed the State,
I do not see how the State can be said to establish religion by
requiring employers to do the same with respect to obligations
owed the employer., 26
The majority of the courts and legislatures 27 have recognized that
employment situations are distinguishable from accommodations of re-
ligion that are permitted in the form of exemptions from state and
federal laws. There must be a different approach to accommodation of
religion in the workplace. The rights and interests of employers, unions
and other employees are significantly affected by the duty which Title
VII imposes. By pronouncing that the Connecticut statute went so far
as to violate the establishment clause, the Court indicated how far an
employer must actually go to carry out Title VII's requirement of
reasonable accommodation. Thornton was an affirmation that the Con-
gress and the courts cannot broadly interpret the statutory duty beyond
Hardison without violating establishment clause principles.
Clare Zerangue
126. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 91, 97 S. Ct. at 2280 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. The majority of state legislatures have passed laws requiring "reasonable accom-
modation" of employee religious practices similar to the Title VII requirement. Subsequent
to the Connecticut Supreme Court's determination of unconstitutionality, the Connecticut
legislature enacted a similar law, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46 (a)-51(18) (1984). See 12 Journal
of Leg. 96, 100, 103 (1985).,
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